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Encouraging consumers to engage in helpful behavior is a perennial task of marketers in non-profit and for-profit organizations. Recent
research suggests that merely imagining the presence of others can lead to less helping behavior on a subsequent unrelated task (Garcia, S.M.,
Weaver, K.D., Moskowitz, G.B., and Darley, J.M. (2002). Crowded minds: The implicit bystander effect. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 83, 843–853.). The present analysis uncovers the boundary conditions of this effect. Across four studies, we establish that the degree
to which a group situation fosters public scrutiny is an important moderator. When group primes are paired with public scrutiny, their inhibitive
effect on helping behavior diminishes, and helping behavior on a subsequent task tends to increase. The present research thus adds complexity to
previous findings by suggesting that implicit bystanders can both decrease and increase helping behavior.
© 2009 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Keywords: Bystander apathy; Helping behavior; Social influence; Public scrutiny; Implicit bystander effectThe classic bystander apathy effect (Darley and Latane,
1968; Darley, Teger, & Lewis, 1973) reveals that the more
people present in a helping behavior situation, the less likely
that each individual person present will actually help. Whether
donating to a fundraising campaign or reporting an emergency,
people are less likely to offer help in the presence of others than
when they are alone. Recently, an extension to the classic
bystander effect has been put forth, called the implicit bystander
effect (Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, & Darley, 2002). It shows
that merely priming the presence of a group can affect helping
behavior on a second task. While classic accounts have assumed
that would-be helpers must be present in the helping behavior
situation in order for bystander apathy to occur, the implicit
bystander effect shows that a similar decrease in helping can be
found even when the would-be helpers are not built into the
facets of the helping situation (Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, &
Darley, 2002). To date no research has investigated boundary⁎ Corresponding authors.
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doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2009.02.013conditions of the implicit bystander effect. In the present
analysis, we focus on public scrutiny, or the degree to which
respondents perceive themselves to be the focus of a group's
attention, as an important moderator of the effect. When group
primes are paired with public scrutiny, their inhibitive effect on
helping behavior diminishes, and helping behavior on a
subsequent task will actually increase.
Understanding the boundary conditions of the implicit
bystander effect informs the consumer behavior literature in
three important ways: (i) it focuses on helping others—a less
represented yet important manifestation of the consumption
experience (Holbrook, 1987); (ii) it advances our theoretical
understanding of the consumer psychology of helping (Bett-
man, 1986; Calder and Tybout, 1987); and (iii) it adds to the
burgeoning literature on nonprofit marketing (e.g., Andreasen
and Kotler, 2003). Indeed, just as understanding the consumer
mindset is important in the for-profit world, “the same is true in
the nonprofit world…Managers in these worlds also realize that
their missions involve influencing donors to give, volunteers to
come forward, clients to seek help, staff to be client-friendly,
and so on” (p. 5, Andreasen and Kotler, 2003). Thus, the present
analysis contributes to the broader consumer behavior literatureed by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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behavior (e.g., Isen, 2001; Mowen and Sujan, 2005; Nelson,
Brunel, Supphellen, & Manchanda, 2006; Strahilevitz, 1999).
Implicit bystander effect
The implicit bystander effect is also important theoretically.
While consumer behavior researchers have long examined the
effect of social influence (Bearden and Etzel, 1982; Childers
and Rao, 1992; Dahl, Manchanda, and Argo, 2001; Moschis,
1976) and social cognition (Zajonc and Markus, 1982; Lynch
and Srull, 1982) on consumer behavior, the implicit bystander
effect examines the intersection of these literatures to under-
stand how priming the presence of social others can affect
helping behavior (e.g., Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder,
2005). In a series of studies (Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, &
Darley, 2002), participants were asked to imagine the presence
of others at Time 1 and then were asked to help on an unrelated
task at Time 2. For example, participants were asked either to
imagine winning a dinner for themselves and ten friends or to
imagine winning a dinner for themselves and one friend.
Afterward, all participants indicated how many minutes they
would be willing to volunteer for an experiment in “the other
room.” Those who imagined ten people at Time 1 volunteered
fewer minutes than did those who imagined only one other
person. These results occurred even though the imagined
individuals were not built into the facets of the helping situation;
that is, these imagined would-be helpers were not in the vicinity
to volunteer. Thus, imagining the presence of others on one task
can spill over and lead to a decrease in helping behavior on a
second, unrelated task.
Boundary conditions: presence of others and social norms
While the implicit bystander effect shows that the presence
of other people frequently decreases the incidence of helping
behavior (Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, & Darley, 2002), recent
research focusing not on helping behavior but on variety
seeking has shown that the presence of other people can also
promote behavior that is consistent with social norms.
Considering that helping behavior is also a norm, one may
hypothesize that this recent research may be relevant in
illuminating conditions under which implicit bystanders may
actually increase rather than decrease the tendency to help
relative to a condition where the respondent is alone.
Ratner and Kahn (2002), for instance, showed that the
presence of another person made norms toward variety seeking
more salient: their respondents made more varied choices in
public than in private. In a related demonstration, Ariely and
Levav (2000) showed that the presence of others can lead
consumers to make choices consistent with the cultural norm of
uniqueness. Consumers dining in groups made more varied
entrée choices than would be expected when compared to a
matched control (Ariely and Levav, 2000, experiment 1).
Presumably, diners eating together feel pressure to make more
varied choices than usual because of the social norm to be
unique. In both cases, the presence of others led consumers tomake decisions more in line with social norms. At first glance,
these findings appear inconsistent with those of the bystander
effect, which shows that the presence of other people leads
respondents to engage in less helping. Given that helping is a
prosocial norm, one may expect more helping in the presence of
others.
One key difference between the findings on social presence
and consumer choice and the implicit bystander studies is in the
type of groups examined in the two literatures. In the study by
Ariely and Levav (2000), for instance, the respondent likely felt
him or herself to be the focus of the group's attention. That is,
when placing an order in a group dining situation, a diner may
feel that “all eyes are upon” him or her. This public scrutiny may
make social norms especially salient (Duval and Wicklund,
1972). If so, then one may predict that perceived public scrutiny
in an implicit bystander setting may actually lead groups to
increase respondents' willingness to help. In contrast, most
studies on the bystander effect, including those examined in the
implicit bystander research, have focused on “mere presence”
group situations—situations in which respondents were a part
of the group, but not a central focus of its attention. Such mere
presence situations may be more likely to instigate diffusion of
responsibility.
A study by Schwartz and Gottlieb (1976) on the classic
bystander effect lends some support to this hypothesis. They
varied whether bystanders to a professionally enacted assault
witnessed the event by themselves or in the presence of “other
subjects” who were presumably also able to help, though not
able to be seen since they were in separated cubicles. Half of the
participants planned to meet the “others” later in the experiment
and the other half were told they would be finishing the study
early and thus not expect future interaction with them. While the
prospect of public scrutiny did not eliminate the bystander
effect, it did appear to lessen it. Participants who were alone
helped the most (92%), followed by those who thought the
others would know their responses (74%), and those expecting
total anonymity (39%).
Social presence and social norms on the implicit level
In the current studies, we vary whether respondents feel they
are under public scrutiny and the focus of a group's attention or
simply part of a group to examine whether this variable
moderates the implicit bystander effect. Building upon the
original motivation behind research on the implicit bystander
effect as well as other recent work on automaticity and social
behavior (e.g., Cheng and Chartrand, 2003; Puntoni and
Tavassoli, 2007; Schlenker and Wowra, 2003), a central focus
of our analysis is whether the effects of public scrutiny paired
with a group context in one situation at Time 1 will
subsequently spill over to affect helping behavior on a second,
unrelated task at Time 2. If so, this would both provide a new
theoretical twist on the implicit bystander effect by identifying
an important moderator, but it would also add to our knowledge
of implicit social cognition in everyday life by showing that
imagined social presence on one task can spill over and affect
responses in different ways on a completely unrelated later task.
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would interact with different levels of public scrutiny. When
participants imagine being in a mere presence group situation,
groups will decrease helping consistent with the implicit
bystander effect. In contrast, we predicted that when the
respondent imagined being in a group situation where attention
from the group was focused on him or her, a reversal of the
implicit bystander effect will occur and groups would actually
increase helping on a subsequent, unrelated task. Such a
predicted cross-over interaction would help reconcile conflict-
ing findings of bystander effectiveness (e.g., Darley and Latane,
1968) with those of social presence and social norms (e.g.,
Ariely and Levav, 2000; Ratner and Kahn, 2002) on an implicit
level, where social others are mentally, not physically, present.
Overview
Our main hypothesis is that there will be a significant
interaction between the type of prime (group prime versus
control prime) and the level of public scrutiny that respondents
feel. We explored the effects of public scrutiny in two principle
ways to build converging validity—as an individual difference
variable (Studies 1 and 2) and as an experimental manipulation
(Studies 3 and 4). Study 1 tested our hypothesis in the context of
real helping behavior captured in a national survey. In Studies
2–4 we systematically examined the impact of implicit
bystanders on respondents' willingness to help in hypothetical
and real helping contexts through a series of scenarios in which
people were asked to imagine the presence of others at Time 1
and indicate their willingness to help at Time 2.
Study 1: Evidence from a large scale survey
We know from naïve realism (Ross and Ward, 1996;
Robinson, Keltner, & Ward, 1995) that people do not always
interpret the same situation in the same way; in fact the same
situation can be subjectively experienced in contrasting ways.
This psychological principle was articulated by Gollwitzer and
Moskowitz (1996), “behavior is not triggered simply by features
of the environment, but by the interaction of those features with
the properties of the individual” (p. 362). We reasoned that an
individual's chronic tendency to feel under the scrutiny of others
would influence their subjective experience of a group situation,
and thus affect their subsequent helping behavior. Specifically,
we predicted that people with a low dispositional tendency to
feel under public scrutiny would chronically be more likely to
experience group contexts as “mere presence” ones. If so, they
should show less helping behavior when imagining being in the
presence of others than after imagining being alone—the
implicit bystander effect. In contrast, we predicted that the
effect would be moderated for people with a high dispositional
tendency to feel under public scrutiny, who are more likely to
approach everyday situations with imaginary audiences in mind.
Because one common criticism of the psychological decision-
making approach is the exclusive use of hypothetical scenarios,
we begin our empirical analysis by probing a dataset of real
helping behavior to test our hypotheses.Dataset
Real helping behavior
We examined the DDB Life Style dataset that was compiled
by DDB Worldwide of Chicago and that was examined in
Bowling alone by Robert Putnam (2000). We downloaded this
dataset, which comprises responses to a national survey that was
administered from 1975 to 1998, from www.bowlingalone.com.
This dataset contained a questioned that asked directly about
survey participants' actual helping behavior—“the frequency of
volunteer work they did in the last 12 months” (1=none, 2=1–4
times, 3=5–8 times, 4=9–11 times, 5=12–24 times, 6=25–51
times, 7=52+ times), which we used as our dependent variable.
In our analysis, we controlled for year of study, age of
respondent, marital status, sex of the respondent, education
level and household income leaving (N=49,466) respondents in
the analysis.
Presence of others
Although previous work on the implicit bystander effect
compares a situation in which people imagine being in the
presence of many other people to a control condition in which
they imagine there is only one or two persons present (Garcia et
al., 2002), the DDB Worldwide dataset offered the opportunity
to explore the effect of the number of bystanders present on
respondents' helping behavior on a larger level. Specifically, we
took advantage of information about the population density of
the area in which the survey participant lived. The dataset
tracked population density into four levels: b50K; 50K–499K;
500K–1.9M; N2M) and we used these population densities to
establish a presence of others differential for analyses (e.g.,
Steblay, 1987). The assumption guiding our choice of this
variable is that participants living in the presence of many
citizens will tend to have more implicit bystanders chronically
accessible in their minds (Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982) than
participants living amongst fewer citizens.
Level of public scrutiny
Our goal was to examine whether the population density in
the area in which the respondent lived affected respondents'
helping behavior differently for individuals who are disposi-
tionally relatively high in public scrutiny versus those who are
dispositionally relatively low in public scrutiny. The dataset
provided responses to a question about self-confidence that we
chose as a proxy for feeling subject public scrutiny: “I have
more self confidence than most of my friends” (1=definitely
disagree, 2=generally disagree, 3 =moderately disagree,
4=moderately agree, 5=generally agree, 6=definitely agree).
We reasoned that respondents higher on self confidence would
feel less under public scrutiny and those lower in self confidence
would feel more under public scrutiny. Of course, we might
have measured the public scrutiny variable slightly differently
had we commissioned this large-scale survey; however, it is
clear that the supposition that this question about self-
confidence and feeling under public scrutiny are highly related
is reasonable. To empirically substantiate this relationship, we
































*Note: Higher numbers equal greater volunteering. 
Fig. 1. The effects of population density of area in which respondents live and
perceived public scrutiny (as measured by self reported self confidence relative
to peers) on volunteering behavior. High population density equals areas with
500,000 or more people; low population density equals areas with less than
500,000 people. Note: Higher numbers equal greater volunteering.
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survey as well as items from the imaginary audiences scale
(Kelly, Jones, & Adams, 2002), a proxy for public scrutiny that
measures the degree to which people feel chronically in the
public eye in everyday situations (e.g., I wonder what other
people are thinking about me at a party; When I am with people
I get nervous because I worry about how much they like me).
The correlation was highly significant in the predicted direction
(N=33, r=− .612, pb .001). People who feel highly self
confident relative to their friends feel under less public scrutiny
while those who are less self confident relative to their friends
feel themselves under more public scrutiny.
Results and discussion
To establish the presence or absence of public scrutiny, we
used participants' evaluations of their self confidence relative to
their peers as a continuous measure in the analysis. Survey
participants who indicated they were highly self-confident
relative to their peers were designated low public scrutiny,
whereas participants who indicated they were not self-confident
relative to their peers were designated high public scrutiny. To
test our prediction that the implicit bystander effect will occur
more strongly among low public scrutiny survey respondents
than among high public scrutiny respondents, we conducted a
regression analysis on the dependent variable volunteer. The
continuous public scrutiny and population density (b50K;
50K–499K; 500K–1.9M; N2M) variables were entered as well
as the interaction between them, and we controlled for year of
study, age of respondent, marital status, sex of respondent, level
of education and household income. As predicted, results
indicated a significant interaction between population density
and the public scrutiny measure in the expected direction,2
B=.05, t=2.8, pb .01. To examine the pattern of means we
used a median split to collapse the population density variable
into high (greater than 500,000) and low (less than 500,000) and
present the mean level of volunteering for each level of the self-
confidence proxy in Fig. 1.
Using evidence from a real world dataset measuring actual
volunteering behavior, this pattern of results is striking.
Consistent with our main hypothesis: respondents who are
low in perceived public scrutiny exhibit the implicit bystander
effect to a greater degree than those who are high on perceived
public scrutiny, who show a slight reversal of the pattern,
actually helping directionally more when in a high density than
a low density area. This pattern of results is not only consistent
with our prediction, it also benefits from the external validity
and experimental richness gained from probing dynamics of
real helping behavior.2 Regression analyses examining population density and public scrutiny
separately indicated that both had significant independent effects on
volunteering, B= .04, t=9.68, pb .001 and B=− .039, t=−8.76, pb .001,
respectively. As would be expected from an implicit bystanders' perspective,
volunteering decreased with increases in population density. Volunteering also
decreased as public scrutiny increased. These simple effects, however, were
qualified by the predicted interaction between population density and public
scrutiny.Still, Study 1 has a number of limitations. For one, because
we did not commission this large national survey, we could not
measure participants' level of feeling under public scrutiny
directly. Similarly, we could not systematically manipulate the
precise presence of implicit bystanders. Even in the few
bystanders condition (i.e., population density b50,000), quite
a number of implicit bystanders are present. Indeed, this could
explain why the reversal of the implicit bystander effect among
the high public scrutiny respondents is not large. The population
density levels used in this analysis (b50K; 50K–499K; 500K–
1.9M; 2M+) are probably best conceptualized as varying levels
of a group condition with no real “alone” control condition.
Nevertheless, given its external validity and focus on actual
helping behavior, Study 1 is a compelling demonstration of the
effect in a real world setting and a useful first step toward
establishing converging evidence for our central hypothesis.
Study 2: Socially anxious personalities and implicit
bystanders
Whereas Study 1 finds evidence that is consistent with our
hypothesis in a dataset of real helping behavior, these findings,
however externally valid, are nevertheless subject to all the
limitations that the experimental approach attempts to remedy.
Although we can reasonably assume that residents of a highly
populated city might chronically imagine a greater presence of
other bystanders than residents of a less populated city, it is
Fig. 2. Based on model, predicted charity values are plotted for alone and group
conditions for low (M−SD), mid (M), and high (M+SD) levels of social
anxiety.
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to this effect. Moreover, though the degree of one's self-
confidence relative to others seems like a reasonable proxy
question for feeling under public scrutiny, we cannot be entirely
certain that self-confidence in this context captures the full
essence of feeling under public scrutiny. Therefore, in Study 2,
we attempt to manipulate, experimentally, whether others are
mentally present or not and examine the effects of social
anxiety—another proxy of public scrutiny—by measuring it
directly using a widely accepted individual difference measure
(Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975).
We predicted that participants' level of dispositional social
anxiety would interact with their subjective experience of a
group situation, and thus affect their subsequent helping
behavior. More specifically, we predicted that people low in
social anxiety would show evidence of the implicit bystander
effect: they would indicate less willingness to help on a second,
unrelated task after imagining a group than after imagining
being alone. In contrast, we predicted that people high in social
anxiety would show the opposite pattern; they would exhibit
relatively greater willingness to help on a second, unrelated task
after imagining a group than after imagining being alone. Thus,
we predicted a cross-over interaction between social anxiety
and the presence of implicit bystanders.
Participants
A total of 108 undergraduates from a Midwestern university
were recruited to participate. Data was collected during three
“Questionnaire Day” sessions. Participants were paid $8 for
completing a 45-minute questionnaire packet.
Procedure
In a between-subjects design, participants were assigned to
one of two presence of bystanders conditions: group condition or
alone control condition. The group condition read, “For a brief
moment, please imagine you are sitting with hundreds of others
in a large lecture hall.” In the alone control condition participants
imagined being alone in the lecture hall and read, “For a brief
moment, please imagine you are sitting all alone in a large lecture
hall.” Everyone then answered a filler question, “What room
temperature would you prefer? (1=Very Cool, 7=Very Warm).”
On the next page, participants completed an “Annual Charity
Contribution” dependent variable. “Imagine you have long since
graduated from college. What percentage of your annual after-
tax earnings would you be willing to donate to charity? (Please
Check)” At this point, participants could check one of the
following percentage ranges: 1% or less, 2%–3%, 4%–5%, 6%–
10%, 11%–15%, 16%–20%, 21%–25%, or over 25%.
To measure social anxiety, participants completed the social
anxiety subscale of the self-consciousness scale (Fenigstein et
al., 1975) in another section of the questionnaire packet. The
social anxiety items were measured on five point scales ranging
from 0=“extremely uncharacteristic” to 4=“extremely char-
acteristic.” Upon completion of the entire questionnaire packet,
participants were thanked and compensated for their time.Results and discussion
We first calculated social anxiety scores for all the
participants by taking the average of their responses to the
social anxiety subscale. We then conducted a regression
analysis to test for the predicted interaction of this continuous
measure with our manipulated presence of others variable
(presence of bystanders: 1=alone, 2=with hundreds of others).
Results from the regression suggest that both presence of
bystanders (B-value=−1.57, β=− .58, pb .05) and social
anxiety (B-value=−1.07, β=− .62, pb .05) were significant
predictors of the willingness to donate to charity. More
importantly, the presence of bystanders×social anxiety inter-
action was significant (B-value= .68, β= .85, pb .05) in
the predicted direction. Based on the model, Charity=2.486+
1.57⁎Alone+ .282⁎Social Anxiety− .68⁎Alone⁎Social Anxi-
ety. Charity values can thus be estimated for the Alone and
Group conditions for low (mean− standard deviation), mid
(mean), and high (mean+standard deviation) levels of social
anxiety (M=2.08, SD=.77). The predicted values are plotted in
Fig. 2.
These results provide further converging evidence of the
predicted cross-over interaction; relative to a control condition
in which respondents imagine being alone, imagining the
presence of others tends to either decrease or increase people's
willingness to help at Time 2, depending on the level of social
anxiety. More specifically, Study 2 suggests that the perception
of an identical prime can be subjectively experienced in
contrasting ways and subsequently affect respondents' will-
ingness to help in opposite directions. Interesting too, while
naïve realism suggests that persons may perceive interpersonal
and intergroup conflict differently (Ross and Ward, 1996;
Robinson, Keltner, & Ward, 1995), the present results also
suggest that the subjective experience of naïve realism may
affect how we construe implicit bystanders, consequently
affecting our decision to help.
Table 1
Helping behavior as a function of type of group prime (social anxiety group vs.
control group) and type of helping behavior measures (hypothetical vs. real),
experiment 3
Type of group prime Charity giving Actual volunteering
Social anxiety group 3.90 3.65
Control group 2.91 2.97
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Studies 1 and 2 used individual difference variables as
proxies to estimate the impact of perceived public scrutiny on
the implicit bystander effect. The premise underlying those
studies was that individuals who are chronically disposed to
feeling that they are the focus of attention of imaginary
audiences (Kelly et al. 2002) would perceive a group prime as
entailing more public scrutiny and focused attention than those
who are low in the tendency to feel the focus of attention of
imaginary audiences. Studies 3 and 4 seek to build further
convergent validity for our hypothesis that public scrutiny
moderates the implicit bystander effect by experimentally
manipulating its presence or absence. Accordingly, Studies 3
and 4 experimentally manipulate public scrutiny in two
different ways. Study 3 manipulates public scrutiny through
an arousing act of embarrassment: tripping and falling down.
This manipulation directly embodies one of the items of the
social anxiety psychometric: “I get embarrassed very easily”
(Fenigstein et al., 1975). Because we are primarily interested in
how public scrutiny affects helping behavior in the presence of
others, Study 3 focused exclusively on two group conditions—a
public scrutiny group condition and a control group condition.
The main prediction was that participants in the public scrutiny
group condition would help more at Time 2 than participants in
the control group condition. A second purpose of Study 3 was to
determine whether hypothetical helping and real helping
worked similarly as dependent variables. For this reason, in
one sample (N=64) we used a hypothetical helping dependent
variable—hypothetical charity giving—while in the other
sample (N=91) we used a real helping measure—the actual
number of minutes participants were willing to spend helping
the researchers with an online survey to be held at a future date.
Study 3: Hypothetical vs. real charitable behavior
Participants and design
A total of 155 undergraduates from two Midwestern
universities participated. Participants were assigned to one of
two between-subjects conditions: public scrutiny group condi-
tion and control group condition. Participants asked to respond
to a hypothetical helping measure filled out the experimental
materials in a “Questionnaire Day” held in a campus classroom
at two Midwestern universities. The materials were embedded
in a packet, which required approximately 45 min to complete.
Participants were paid $8.00. Participants asked to respond to
the real helping measure were recruited at the library and
campus student centers and did not receive compensation for
their participation.
Procedure
The public scrutiny group condition read as follows on the
first page: “Imagine you are walking in (the name of a popular
campus lecture hall) during the change of classes. People are
walking around on their way to class, and you trip and fall.”Then participants responded to a filler question, “What room
temperature would you prefer? (1=Cool, 7=Warm).” Partici-
pants in the group control condition read the identical scenario,
minus “and you trip and fall.”
Hypothetical helping sample: charity giving
Participants in the hypothetical helping behavior sample
completed on the second page the “Annual Charity Contribu-
tion” dependent variable used in Study 2.
Real helping sample: volunteering for online survey
Participants in the real helping behavior sample were asked
on the second page: “In addition to this survey, we are
conducting a voluntary online survey. How much time would
you be willing to spend on this online survey?” (Participants
then check-off: 0 minutes, 2 minutes, 5 minutes, 10 minutes,
15 minutes, 20 minutes, 25 minutes, or 30 minutes). Participants
were then prompted to, “Please write your e-mail so that we can
e-mail you the appropriate link for the survey.” To requite their
willingness to volunteer, we e-mailed all participants who
indicated a willingness to volunteer a short online survey about
decision-making, after completing the data collection for Study
3.
Results and discussion
We predicted that those in the public scrutiny group
condition would help more than those in the control group
condition, and that hypothetical and real helping measures
would act similarly. In order to standardize responses for
analysis, we first computed separate z-scores of the helping
behavior measures for each of the two types of helping (charity
giving versus real volunteering). We then conducted a 2 (type of
group prime: public scrutiny group versus control group)×2
(type of helping behavior: hypothetical versus real helping)
ANOVA. As predicted, this analysis revealed a significant main
effect for type of group prime, F(1,151)=7.16, pb .01. This
showed that collapsing across type of helping measure, those in
the public scrutiny group condition helped more (M=.21;
SD=.97) than those in the control group condition (M=− .19;
SD=.99). Also as predicted, there was no significant interaction
between type of group prime and type of helping behavior, F
(1,151)=1.56, p=.22, ns. This indicates that the hypothetical
helping measure and the real helping measure acted similarly.
Table 1 presents the condition means for each of the experi-
mental conditions in terms of the original metrics measured.
Study 3 provides further evidence that public scrutiny plays a
role in predicting helping behavior following implicit bystander
situations. Individuals are more likely to help after imagining
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paired with public scrutiny. Hence, Study 3 adds converging
evidence to the idea that when perceived public scrutiny,
whether as the manifestation of an individual difference or
paired with a group prime, coincides with imagination of
bystanders at Time 1, individuals will tend to help more at Time
2. Study 3 also indicates that dependent measures involving
hypothetical helping behavior and real helping behavior are
affected similarly by group primes.
Study 4: Public scrutiny through evaluation apprehension
Whereas Study 3 manipulated perceived public scrutiny by
having participants imagine a socially embarrassing situation
(i.e., tripping and falling), Study 4 focuses on another facet of
social scrutiny by manipulating whether respondents feel that
their ability is being judged or evaluated by others. Schwartz
and Gottlieb's (1976) investigation is relevant here. As
mentioned previously, these authors varied whether partici-
pants believed they would be meeting with the “other
bystanders” later in the study or not, and showed that those
anticipating future interaction helped more frequently than
those not expecting to meet others. Schwartz and Gottlieb
(1976) interpreted their results in terms of evaluation
apprehension. Respondents expecting others to know about
their behavior were more motivated to behave prosocially than
those not expecting future interaction. In Study 4 we tested
whether public scrutiny from evaluation apprehension would
also influence willingness to help in implicit bystander
situations. Specifically, we investigated whether evaluation
apprehension would interact with a group prime to differen-
tially influence willingness to help on a separate, unrelated task
at Time 2.
In a between-subjects design, business school undergradu-
ates either made a series of business decisions that had right or
wrong answers (high evaluation apprehension condition) or
simply expressed their preferences toward a matched set of
scenarios (low evaluation apprehension condition). After
completing one of these two tasks, participants were presented
with either a group prime or a one person control prime. Finally,
all respondents completed a dependent measure that measured
their willingness to help. Again, our main prediction was a
cross-over interaction between the evaluation apprehension
manipulation and the group prime. Those in the low evaluation
apprehension condition should tend to show an implicit
bystander effect and help less following a group prime than
the control prime. In contrast, those in the high evaluation
apprehension condition should tend to feel more public scrutiny
and thus tend to express a greater willingness to help after the
group prime than after the control prime.
Participants
A total of 307 undergraduates at a large southeastern
university participated in a laboratory study in exchange for
extra credit in their Introduction to Marketing class. Students
completed the experimental manipulations and dependentvariables on a computer through the self-guided computer
software program MediaLab.
Procedure
This study used a 2 (evaluation apprehension: 1=high;
2= low)×2 (presence of bystanders: 1=one person control,
2= ten person) between-subjects design.
Evaluation apprehension
High evaluation apprehension participants completed
between five and ten scenarios, all requiring them to make a
business decision that involved predicting what others would
prefer. For instance, one of the scenarios read as follows: “You
are in charge of marketing for an airline and you want to
increase the airline's appeal to upper class customers…If your
goal is to make customers perceive your tickets will be the most
expensive, which ratings would you advertise on your website?
(choose A or B).” Those in the low evaluation apprehension
condition completed a matched set of scenarios, but simply
expressed their personal preferences for which there was no
right or wrong answer (e.g., for the airline scenario they
indicated how much they would pay to fly on the airline).
To confirm that the scenarios manipulated evaluation
apprehension, a separate group of respondents (N=22) read
either the high evaluation apprehension scenarios or the low
evaluation apprehension scenarios and answered the following
Likert survey item after each scenario, To what extent is this a
situation where you will be evaluated by others and want to do
the right thing in their eyes? (1=not applicable/not at all;
7=very much). In addition, for each scenario, respondents
indicated the number of “others” they had been thinking of
when answering the evaluation question. This test confirmed
that the manipulation was successful; averaging across the
scenarios, high evaluation apprehension respondents expressed
more evaluation apprehension (M=4.89; SD=1.05) than low
evaluation apprehension respondents (M=3.05; SD=.85), F(1,
20)=19.78, pb .0001. Respondents' reports of the number of
others who would be evaluating them were highly skewed so
they were log transformed and the log transformed values were
used in statistical analyses. Both the log transformed numbers
and actual numbers are reported below. Averaging across the
scenarios, high evaluation apprehension respondents reported
thinking of a larger number of others when answering the
evaluation apprehension questions (log values: M=2.84;
SD=1.89; actual numbers: M=40,746; SD=86,618) than
respondents reading the low evaluation apprehension scenarios
(log values: M= .50; SD= .54; actual numbers: M=5.95;
SD=8.15), F=14.2, pb .01.
Presence of others
The computer then presented participants with either a group
prime or a control prime. The group condition read: “Imagine
you won a dinner for yourself and 10 of your friends at your
favorite restaurant.” In the single person control, participants
imagined one other person: “Imagine you won a dinner for
yourself and a friend at your favorite restaurant.” Everyone then
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likely make your reservation? (please check one).” The
computer then presented participants with the Annual Charity
Contribution dependent variable used in Study 2.
Results and discussion
To examine our main prediction we performed a 2
(evaluation apprehension: 1=high; 2= low)×2 (presence of
bystanders: 1=one person control, 2= ten person) ANOVA,
using the annual charity giving percentage as the dependent
variable. Analyses revealed no main effects for evaluation
apprehension or presence of bystanders, both F'sb1. More
importantly and as predicted, analyses revealed a significant
evaluation apprehension×presence of bystanders interaction, F
(1, 303)=5.87, pb .05. When respondents were under low
evaluation apprehension, they tended to indicate a willingness
to give less following the group prime (M=2.77; SD=1.09)
than after the one person control (M=3.03; SD=1.14).
However, when participants were under high evaluation
apprehension, they tended to indicate a willingness to give
more after the group prime (M=3.00; SD=1.24) than after the
one person control prime (M=2.63; SD=.96). To test the
predicted cross-over interaction pattern, we conducted a
contrast analysis using the following weights (Rosenthal and
Rosnow, 2008): +1 (no evaluation apprehension, one person
control condition), −1 (no evaluation apprehension, group
condition), −1 (evaluation apprehension, one person control
condition), and +1 (evaluation apprehension, group condition).
As predicted, this predicted cross-over pattern was significant
(F(1,303)=5.91, pb .05).
These results build on Studies 1–3 by providing further
converging evidence that public scrutiny can moderate the
effect of imagining the presence of others at Time 1 on
helping behavior at Time 2. More specifically, Study 4 shows
that completing a prior task that engenders evaluation
apprehension—a form of public scrutiny—can significantly
interact with a group prime to differentially affect respondents'
willingness to help. In this cross-over interaction, participants
experiencing low public scrutiny tended to help less following a
group prime relative to the control condition, whereas partici-
pants experiencing high public scrutiny tended to help more
following a group prime relative to the control condition.
General discussion
These findings build a theoretical bridge between the
bystander apathy literature (e.g., Darley and Latane, 1968;
Latane and Darley, 1968) and the literature on social presence
and social norms (Ariely and Levav, 2000; Ratner and Kahn,
2002) on an implicit level. While one research stream has
contended that as the number of bystanders present in a helping
situation increases, each individual will feel less compunction to
help (e.g., Darley and Latane, 1968), a reciprocal research
stream has argued that the presence of others can lead
respondents to behave in ways that are consistent with social
norms. Considering that helping others is a strong social norm,these two literatures seem to make contradictory predictions
about whether the presence of implicit bystanders will increase
versus decrease helping. Examining the moderating role of the
type of group involved, and in particular whether it is paired
with public scrutiny, the present analysis finds that implicit
bystanders at Time 1 will lead to less helping behavior at Time 2
when the group is a “mere presence” one and to more helping
behavior at Time 2 if the same group prime is accompanied by a
feeling of public scrutiny.
An interesting aspect of the current research is the
demonstration that the effect of group primes on the inhibition
versus the facilitation of helping behavior can be affected by
respondents' perceptions of public scrutiny as well as by the
actual level of public scrutiny respondents are under. That is,
respondents low on self confidence (Study 1) and high on social
anxiety (Study 2)—personality variables that past work has
associated with going through everyday life with imaginary
audiences in mind (Kelly et al., 2002)—responded differently to
implicit bystander situations than those with greater self
confidence and less social anxiety. Indeed, our analysis
indicates that the identical group prime, be it the number of
implicit bystanders chronically accessible due to the population
density of one's area of residence or a hypothetical scenario
involving an everyday classroom setting, is interpreted by some
to entail public scrutiny and by others as a mere presence group
situation.
Theoretical implications and future directions
Taken together with four empirical demonstrations that
systematically vary the variables of interest for the sake of
convergent validity, the present analysis clearly implicates the
role of public scrutiny in a group context as a moderator of the
implicit bystander effect. In doing so, it raises several interesting
questions for future research. In particular, the observed effects
of public scrutiny in a group situation may be driven through
two possible mechanisms. One possibility is that feeling that
one is in the public eye may instigate an impression manage-
ment process. While one may assume that impression manage-
ment would be more likely to have an effect if the audience that
is scrutinizing the respondent is real rather than imagined, and is
the same audience that will witness the helping behavior (e.g.,
Schwartz and Gottlieb, 1976), recent evidence suggests that
impression management goals can actually be automatically
activated, even in the absence of direct interaction with a group
(Puntoni and Tavassoli, 2007). If so, then our observed effect of
increased willingness to help in the face of public scrutiny may
be driven by an increased salience of social norms and
expectations. This possibility is interesting because it would
build on recent research demonstrating that activation of self
presentational goals can spill over and influence behavior in
new situations (e.g., Schlenker and Wowra, 2003). While
automatic activation of self presentational goals may be one
possible explanation for the effect, an equally interesting
possibility is that perceiving oneself to be a focus of public
scrutiny may increase respondents' level of arousal. This
increased arousal may in turn increase respondents' willingness
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perceptions of the seriousness of the helping request. Indeed,
several studies have suggested a link between arousal and
helping (e.g., Clark and Word, 1972, 1974; Coke, Batson, &
McDavis, 1978; Griffitt and Veitch, 1971; Harris and Hwang,
1973; Gaertner and Dovidio, 1977; Piliavin and Piliavin, 1975;
Piliavin, Piliavin, & Rodin, 1975; Amato, 1986). To the degree
that perceptions of public scrutiny increase respondents' level of
arousal, this could lead to more helping in the group condition.
These two potential explanations are reminiscent of a long
standing debate in social psychology involving how investiga-
tors may achieve empirical reconciliation of impression
management and intrapsychic explanations for social behavior
(e.g., Tetlock and Manstead, 1985). While at first glance it
appears as if the two motivations are easily empirically
separable, a closer look demonstrates that they are interwoven.
For instance, it is likely that impression management concerns
may produce negative arousal. As anyone who has given an
important presentation in front of a group can attest, an attempt
to create a good impression often co-occurs with an arousal
state. Similarly, the experience of arousal qua arousal may alert
respondents to a change in their environment, which could
potentially be interpreted in a way that instigates impression
management concerns. While the resolution of this issue is
beyond the scope of the present analysis, a promising direction
for future research is to attempt to design studies that disentangle
these two possibilities, while at the same time acknowledging
that oftentimes “no neat arbitrary line divides the intrapsychic
from the social” (Tetlock and Manstead, 1985, p. 67.)
On a more general level, the present analysis also has
implications for the debate about the epistemology of helping
behavior. While one research stream largely considered helping
behavior a manifestation of altruistic intentions (e.g., Batson,
Darley, & Coke, 1978; Krebs, 1975), other theorists argued that
the basis for helping behavior was rooted in hedonic intentions
(e.g., Paliavin, et al., 1975). The present analysis, however,
broaches yet another dimension on the origins of helping
behavior—a social cognitive account. Implicit bystanders, who
are not parties in the facets of the helping situation, may
influence the willingness to help on a subconscious level, not
strictly as a consequence of altruism or hedonism per se.
As for future directions, it also would be interesting to
establish a theoretical link between the implicit bystander effect
and self-categorization (e.g., Hogg, 2001). Self-categorization
describes the process by which an individual categorizes
themselves in terms of a social category based on environmental
cues. For instance, Americans upon arriving in London are
more likely to categorize themselves as “Americans” than when
arriving in Boston. A promising direction for future research
would be to examine whether simply asking people to self
categorize as a group member versus an individual would
instigate an implicit bystander process.
Practical implications
While the present analysis reveals a new theoretical twist in
our understanding of group primes and helping behavior, itsimultaneously offers practical implications for marketers in
nonprofit and for-profit worlds and even policymakers whose
common task is frequently attempting to get consumers to be
more helpful. Indeed, while the practical implications of
research on the classic bystander effect, examining how the
presence of actual bystanders affects helping behaviors in real
world emergency situations are clear, research on the implicit
bystander effect, examining the effects of imaginary audiences
on helping, may actually be more relevant to the daily activities
of marketers. That is, in many helping appeals, it is implicit
bystanders rather than actual ones who are invoked. For
instance, charity fundraising campaign managers typically use
references to an aggregate of other individuals in their appeal
for funds—“Join the thousands of people who have made a
pledge.” While this social proof strategy—the general notion
that many other people are engaging in a certain behavior—is
among the most powerful forces of social influence (Cialdini,
1993), the present analysis suggests that imagining many others
giving to charity may not necessarily lead to an increase in
helping behavior. Indeed, one critical question is whether or not
the conjured image of these “many others” is accompanied by a
perception of public scrutiny. If imagining many others giving
to charity incites a perception of public scrutiny such as when
agencies ask for donations in a way that puts consumers “on the
spot,” then people are probably more likely to give. If not, then
they are probably less likely to give. Although the objective of
the present analysis is primarily a theoretical one, it nevertheless
underscores the practical importance of considering whether
implicit bystanders facilitate or impede helping behavior.
Accordingly, practitioners should monitor their use of implicit
bystanders in their appeals, as savvy marketers already do with
other variables, to better understand whether implicit bystanders
ultimately advance or thwart their helping behavior initiatives.
Conclusion
Merging the findings on bystander apathy (Darley and
Latane, 1968; Darley, Teger, & Lewis, 1973) with the literature
on social presence and social norms (Ariely and Levav, 2000;
Ratner and Kahn, 2002), the present analysis dovetails two
seemingly contradictory research streams by investigating how
public scrutiny interacts with group primes to affect helping
behavior on an implicit level. Whereas recent findings on the
implicit bystander effect (Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, &
Darley, 2002) suggested that simply imagining the presence
of others is sufficient to inhibit helping behavior on an unrelated
task, this effect is largely limited to circumstances where the
group prime is not paired with public scrutiny. When the group
prime induces or coincides with a perception of public scrutiny,
helping behavior will tend to increase on a subsequent task.
Thus, implicit bystanders can both decrease and increase
helping behavior.
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